



# **Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics**

## **Demographic and Social Consequences of the Separation Barrier on the West Bank**

**April, 2004**

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## **Preface**

The Israeli authorities decided to erect a barrier (wall) along the entire West Bank borders with Israel to limit Palestinian movement alongside the borders and into Israel and to provide maximum Israeli control over Palestinian lands on the West Bank side of the “Green Line”. The wall affects not only those Palestinians living directly on both sides of its path, but also the already stagnated socioeconomic conditions of many other communities in western part of the West bank at large.

Past experience indicates that Israel takes advantage of its ability to restrict Palestinian movement in the Occupied Territory to accomplish forbidden objectives and is driven by considerations unrelated to its security. The restrictions on movement gravely harms the thousands of Palestinians who will have difficulty going to their fields and marketing their produce in other areas of the West Bank.

Among other effects of the wall, population mobility along and across the wall are expected to lead to certain difficulties at the short run, and to changes in the demographic structure of the communities where the wall passes through at the medium and long run. Therefore, PCBS made all possible efforts to monitor the impact of the wall on population dynamics as well as socioeconomic conditions of affected households and local economy to provide regular data flow on socioeconomic developments alongside the wide area surrounding the Wall will to enable the Palestinian National Authority and the international community to respond very early and appropriately to the needs of the affected population.

Within this framework, PCBS conducted a household survey in the localities where the wall passes through, in which this report is an attempt to provide some more analytical view for the insights of the finding of the mentioned survey. The report presents a descriptive analysis on the impact of separation wall on population mobility and household structure.

We hope that the findings of this report provides more policy oriented analysis for the Palestinian policy makers and international community concerned.

**April, 2004**

**Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Ph.D.  
President**

## **List of acronyms and organizations**

B'Tselem:	The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in The Occupied Territories
IBRD:	International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
IDF:	Israel Defence Force
MERLIN:	Healthcare in Crisis (NGO based in United Kingdom)
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA:	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PA:	Palestinian Authority
PCBS:	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PENGON:	The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network
PLO:	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNA:	Palestinian National Authority
UNFPA:	United Nations Population Fund
UNSCO:	United Nations Special Coordinator

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## **Executive Summary**

Despite the fact that the expansion and annexation wall is not yet completed and it is too early to observe many of the social implications of it, and the fact that some of the effects will take time to become manifest as migration, the households will first have to learn how it is to live with the new situation caused by the wall, and then find coping mechanisms.

Only if it become too difficult to handle the problems caused by the wall will they consider drastic changes such as migrating to another locality or country, if they are able to do so. There may perhaps also be some changes in the social and commercial infrastructure, which may alleviate some of the problems. New shops may be established and some new schools and health centres may perhaps be built. Thus, some implications will only be visible after a long time, perhaps a year or more, such as income from agriculture, whereas other implications will be almost immediate, such as movement restrictions and difficulties in accessing social services, and then perhaps wane. All this complicates the ability to observe the effects of the wall on the society. But it highlights the need to have a good and flexible program for monitoring various aspects of the wall, which PCBS has already embarked upon.

This research highlighted a number of impacts of the wall on the well-being of the Palestinian population, particularly loss of land, jobs and income, in addition to serious restrictions on movement and social relations suffering. This wall led also to reduced access to services and it was concluded the need of emergency health including deliveries suffering. The wall negatively impacted the educational quality, which may gradually deteriorate as a result of new situation and measures. It was also concluded that people living west of the wall are affected much more than on the east

Some of the effects of the wall that cannot yet be measured or are difficult to observe are:

- Migration
- Household composition
- Gender roles
- Health conditions
- Quality and amount of education
- Effects on gender roles due to greater responsibilities of women in split families and more women students living alone

The separation barrier is still at an early stage and not completed, yet there are already clear negative effects on social and economic conditions. These negative effects are expected to intensify as it continues to be built.

## Background and Terminology

### 1.1: Length of barrier and affected land and people

On 14 April 2002 the Government of Israel decided to build a system of fences, walls, ditches and barriers in the West Bank.. The construction of the barrier began in the northern West Bank in June 2002. More than 180 km have so far been completed and information from the Israeli Government indicates that the construction of a further 507 km is planned (see table 1).

The path of the barrier frequently takes the shape of long "fingers" that are protruding into the West Bank to encircle Israeli settlements. This has created many barriers *inside* the West Bank as well, and not only between the West Bank and Israel, separating villages from their farmland and from nearby cities, making travelling very difficult, time-consuming and unpredictable. Because of the barrier's meandering path into the West Bank, its total length will be more than twice the length of the Green Line. The total length of the planned barrier could be as long as between 654 km (B'Tselem) and 786 km (Negotiations Affairs Department, PLO). Only 11 per cent of the Wall's length runs along the Green Line (the 1948 Armistice Line), and even there it is usually built 50-100 meters inside the West Bank. For the rest, the Wall's planned path cuts deep into the West Bank – up to 22 km, see Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Photograph of separation barrier (fence) outside the city of Qalqiliya**



Photo: H. Brunborg, 17 January 2004

**Figure 2: Construction of wall in Tulkarm Governorate**



Source: PENGON, <http://www.pengon.org/album/pic/pic8.html>

A wall has been erected in certain places to protect against gunfire, such as in Jerusalem and near the Trans-Israel Highway in Qalqiliya and Tulkarm, see Figure 3 and One would assume that the 8-meter wall would be less land-consuming than the wide system of fences and trenches described above, but the IDF is planning an additional barrier to the east of the wall, the so-called ‘depth barrier’. Thus, both the wall and the fence consume substantial Palestinian land, in addition to restricting movement. For Palestinians the difference between the two types of barrier is that the eight-meter tall wall blocks the view and that it gives an even stronger impression of living in a closed-in ghetto.

**Figure 3: Photograph of separation barrier (wall) in the city of Qalqiliya**



Photo: H. Brunborg, 17 January 2004

The estimates of the land and people affected by the wall vary but the size and numbers are very large, see table 2. According to the official Israeli plans for the Barrier, approximately 975 square kilometres, or 16.6 per cent of the entire West Bank, will lie between the Barrier and the Green Line, with a population of 17,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and 220,000 in East Jerusalem. If the full route is completed, another 160,000 Palestinians will live in enclaves, areas where the Barrier almost completely encircles communities and tracts of land. The planned route incorporates nearly 320,000 settlers, including approximately 178,000 in East Jerusalem (UN 2003).

“Approximately 210,000 acres - or 14.5 percent - of West Bank land (excluding East Jerusalem) will lie between the Wall and the Green Line, according to the latest Israeli Government projection of the West Bank Wall. This includes 37,000 acres in enclaves, 153,000 acres in closed areas and 20,000 acres in secondary barriers or depth barriers that IDF has planned to build. This land, some of the most fertile in the West Bank, is currently the home for more than 274,000 Palestinians living in 122 villages and towns. Of these, 161,000 will live in enclaves, 96,000 will be inside the depth barriers and 17,000 will be in closed areas between the wall and the Green line. More than 400,000 other Palestinians living to the east of the Wall will need to cross it to get to their farms, jobs and services. This means that over 674,000 - approximately 30 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank - will be directly harmed by the Wall. “ (OCHA 2003)

The Negotiations Affairs Department of PLO has estimated, based on Israeli plans and announcements, that “approximately 45% of the Occupied West Bank (containing approximately 94% of the illegal Israeli settlers) will be de facto annexed by Israel.”<sup>1</sup>

**Table 1: Length and status of barrier sections**

Section*	Main Barrier Length (Km)	Secondary Barrier Length (Km)	Status
Stage 1: Sallem-Elqana	138	42	Approved, Aug. 2002. Main barrier near completion. Secondary barrier not yet begun.
Stage 2: Sallem-Tayasir	60	-	Approved, under construction
Stage 3: Elqana-Ofer	186	40	Approved, Oct. 2003. Construction has begun.
Stage 4: Har Gilo-Carmel	114	23	Approved, not yet under construction
"Jerusalem Envelope"	50	1	Approved, partly completed and partly under construction
<b>Total</b>	<b>548</b>	<b>106</b>	
Overall length of the barrier	654		

Source: <http://www.btselem.org>, 9 February 2004.

**Table 2: Palestinian population affected by the barrier**

Location	Number of Communities	Number of Residents	Percentage of West Bank Palestinian Population
Enclaves surrounded by the barrier*	81	263,200	11.4
East Jerusalem**	23	210,000	9.1
Communities to the east of the*** barrier	102	402,400	17.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>875,600</b>	<b>38.0</b>

Source: <http://www.btselem.org>, 9 February 2004.

- \* Includes communities surrounded by the barrier (i.e. the main barrier, secondary barrier, or a combination of the two), and communities trapped between the barrier and the Green Line.
- \*\* Palestinian neighbourhoods within Jerusalem's municipal borders
- \*\*\* Includes communities that lie immediately to the east of the barrier whose residents will need to cross it to access farmland, jobs or health services.

<sup>1</sup> Israel's "Security Wall": Bad Fences Make Bad Neighbors, December 2003, <http://www.nad-plo.org/fl.php>

**Table 3: Land Affected by the Barrier**

	Area (in Dunams*)	Percentage of West Bank Land
Expropriated for construction of the barrier	28,000	0.5
Between main barrier and Green Line and enclaves surrounded by the barrier	845,000	15.1
In East Jerusalem (between the city's boundary and Green Line)	70,000	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>943,000</b>	<b>16.8</b>

\* 4 dunams = 1 acre.

Source: <http://www.btselem.org>, 9 February 2004.

About 165,000 dunams of land has been confiscated in the localities that the wall passed through in August 2003, 124,323 dunams of private land and 40,460 dunams of governmental land, according to PCBS (2003a) (table 6, Locality Survey). About 106,000 dunams of this is agricultural land (table 7, Locality Survey). 22,298 dunams were shovelled in connection with the construction of the wall (table 8, locality survey).

**Table4: Confiscated land in localities that the separation wall passes through**

Governorate/ Region	The Area (Dunum)		
	Total	Governmental	Private
Jenin	57404	37143	20261
Tulkarm	39860	2465	37395
Qalqiliya	49877	800	49077
Salfit	6040	40	6000
Jerusalem	7946	12	7934
Bethlehem	3656	0	3656
<b>Total</b>	<b>164783</b>	<b>40460</b>	<b>124323</b>

Source: PCBS Localities Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, August 2003.

28.5 percent of the household had all or some of their land confiscated (see Table 5). More households living east of the wall lost all their land than households living west of the wall. On the other hand, relatively more households west of the wall lost *some* of their land. Almost all of the land that was confiscated was agricultural (95.5 percent).

**Table 5: Confiscated Palestinian Land. Percent of households**

Confiscation	Total	Location relative to Separation Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
All Land was Confiscated	11.8	12.3	7.4
Part of the Land was Confiscated	16.7	16.0	23.0
No Land was Confiscated	71.5	71.7	69.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

## 1.2: Terminology

The Israeli Government calls the barrier system 'Security Fence', although it is considering changing the name to 'Terror Prevention Fence', to improve its international image.<sup>2</sup> The system is called the 'Separation wall' by most Palestinian organizations, whereas one Palestinian NGO calls it the 'Apartheid wall'. On 20 January 2004 the Cabinet of PNA decided to call it the 'Expansion and annexation wall'. The differences in the terminology show the highly political nature of this issue.

Neither 'fence' nor 'wall' is correct in a linguistic sense, since the barrier system consists of walls, fences, electric fences, razor wire, trenches, military patrol roads, etc. The barrier is obviously much more than a *fence*. On the other hand, it is strictly speaking not a *wall* either, except for a minor part (about 3 percent).

There are, of course, not only linguistic differences in the description and perception of the barrier, the political and socio-economic aspects and implications are much more important, as mentioned above. As reflected in the official terminology, Israel emphasizes security aspects when justifying the construction of the barrier<sup>3</sup>, while Palestinians are mostly concerned about the loss of land.<sup>4</sup> There is doubt that Israel is using the opportunity created by the decision of constructing this wall to expand the area available for Israeli settlements, particularly when considering the fact that this wall is not constructed on the Green line but inside the Palestinian Territory in the West Bank. This is consistent with the views of leading Israeli politicians on a unilateral solution, especially to solve the 'demographic problem': "*To maximize the number of Jews; minimize the number of Palestinians*".<sup>5</sup>

Another language (but less political) problem is what each of the two sides of the barrier should be called. The terms "east of the wall" and "west of the wall" are often used, for example by PCBS (2003a,b). By "west of the wall" is meant areas that fall between the barrier and the Green Line (the border before June 1967), also called the Closed Military Zone by Israel. This is not always geographically correct, however, since some of the areas that are

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<sup>2</sup> "Israel is considering a name change for its massive complex of walls, fences and watch towers in the West Bank to improve its international image -- the "Terror Prevention Fence." The new title for what is now called the "security fence" is part of an intensifying public relations battle as officials on both sides bring in high-powered legal and publicity advisers ahead of a Feb. 23 world court hearing on the wall's legality." (Associated Press, 15 January 2004, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2004/01/15/international1535EST0670.DTL>).

<sup>3</sup> "The Security Fence is an operational concept conceived by the Israeli Defense Establishment in order to reduce the number of terrorist attacks whether in the form of explosive-rigged vehicles or in the form of suicide bombers who enter into Israel with the intention of murdering innocent babies, children, women and men. Sadly, this abhorrent phenomenon has become common practice since September 2000." (<http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/default.htm>, Ministry of Defence, 18. January 2004). "Israel's controversial West Bank separation barrier is vital to the future of the Jewish state, a senior military official said as the government builds up its case ahead of hearing by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). "If we lose the confidence that we can live peacefully, that we can send our children to school, we have lost everything... By building this fence, we are not just saving lives, we are saving the country, we are saving the Jewish state," the official told reporters on condition of anonymity. (AFP, 14 January 2004", [http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=1515&ncid=1515&e=8&u=/afp/20040114/wl\\_mideast\\_afp/mideast\\_barrier\\_israel\\_040114191909](http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=1515&ncid=1515&e=8&u=/afp/20040114/wl_mideast_afp/mideast_barrier_israel_040114191909)).

<sup>4</sup> "Israel's goal in building the "security" wall is twofold: (1) to confiscate Palestinian land in order to facilitate further colony expansion and unilaterally redraw geopolitical borders and (2) to encourage an exodus of Palestinians by denying the ability to earn a living from their land, by denying them adequate water resources, and by restricting freedom of movement to such extent as to make remaining in the town or village an unviable option. If the wall were truly about security, the wall would have been built on Israel's 1967 pre-occupation border (the "Green line"). However, the wall is not being built on the Green Line, but rather well within Occupied Palestinian Territory." ("Israel's 'Security' Wall: Another Land Grab", October 2003, PLO Negotiations Department. [www.nad-plo.org](http://www.nad-plo.org)).

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in *Ha'aretz*, 5 December 2003, <http://www.haaretz.com/GA/pages/ShArtGA.jhtml?itemNo=360533>.

between the Green Line and the barrier are, in fact, located north, south or even east of the barrier, due to its irregular path. Another terminology that is used is "inside" and "outside", where "inside" means the area between the Green Line and the wall (the Closed Zone). This may be appropriate as seen from Israel, but seen from the West Bank this area is really *outside* the barrier.

There are also other complications, such as "double-fenced" areas (Qibya, Saffa and Biddu north-east of Jerusalem); enclaves that are completely surrounded by a barrier and has only a few gates, such as Qalqiliya, or only a narrow opening to the rest of the West Bank such as Habla; and closure of villages and cities such as Ramallah and Nablus, which are not encircled by a barrier but which have similar restricted access. Numerous checkpoints and roads are closed for Palestinian cars.


Moreover, there are Israeli plans to build a barrier in the Jordan Valley in the eastern part of the West Bank, as shown in Figure 4 but a final decision on this has not yet been taken. It is possible that the plan will be changed due to international reactions to the wall.

Thus, there are many Israeli measures and restrictions that are obstacles to the free movement on the West Bank, with a negative impact on the economy, social conditions and human rights, and which make life of the Palestinians very difficult.

Figure 4: Map of the completed or planned barrier in the West Bank

### ISRAEL'S "SECURITY" WALL: ANOTHER LAND GRAB DECEMBER 2003


Israel's goal in building the "security" wall is twofold: (1) to confiscate Palestinian land in order to facilitate further colony expansion and unilaterally redraw geopolitical borders and (2) to encourage an exodus of Palestinians by denying them the ability to earn a living from their land, by denying them adequate water resources, and by restricting freedom of movement to such extent as to make remaining in the town or village an unviable option.



Source: Negotiation Affairs Department Palestinian Liberation Organization.



**Figure 5: Map of the wall in Qalqiliya**  
**WEST BANK WALL: FOCUS ON QALQILIYA AND JAYYUS**




Source: Negotiation Affairs Department Palestinian Liberation Organization.



Figure 6: Map of the constructed and planned wall in Jerusalem

**ISRAEL'S "SECURITY" WALL IN OCCUPIED EAST JERUSALEM**



Source: Negotiation Affairs Department Palestinian Liberation Organization



### **1.3: PCBS data on the consequences of the expansion and annexation wall**

PCBS has collected a considerable amount of social and economic data for the West Bank, such as the 1997 Population Census and several household surveys, including Demographic Survey (1995); Health Survey (1996, 2000); Nutrition Survey (2002); Income and Expenditure Survey (almost every year since 1996); and Labor Force Survey. In addition to the PCBS data sources, data are collected by various ministries, NGOs and research institutions.

The problems with most of these data with regard to the wall are that they were collected before it was constructed or that they do not specifically address the implications of the barrier. Most of the NGO studies on the wall are rather *ad hoc* and usually cover only a limited area and a small number of households.

PCBS has established a special unit to monitor the impact of the Israeli measures. As part of the program for this several data-collecting exercises have been started to obtain statistics about the implications of the separation barrier. This report is primarily based on these sources:

- Survey on the Impact of Israeli Measures on the Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households (1<sup>st</sup> round March 2001, 6<sup>th</sup> round July-August 2003), see PCBS (2003c) (7<sup>th</sup> round October-December 2003). The last round over sampled localities near the wall but no results from this have yet been published.
- Monitoring of health, education and agriculture: Data are collected on various indicators in localities directly affected by the barrier by field workers who visit public and other institutions, including regional offices of the ministries of health, education and agriculture. The mayors in the localities are asked about confiscation of land, environmental factors, water sources, etc. The field workers are recording examples of individuals and families experiencing special problems. Some of these examples are included in Annex 1 and referred to in this report.
- Survey on the Impact of Separation Wall on the Localities Where it Passed Through, August 2003. At that time approximately 180 km of the Barrier had been completed (UN 2003). This survey was taken in all the 76 localities where the barrier was finished or under construction. In some of the localities in Jerusalem the wall was not yet finished. The data were only collected at the locality level. The results from the survey were published at a press conference in August 2003 (PCBS 2003a).
- Table shows the population size and the sampled households in each Governorate and by type of locality (urban-rural). Annex 2 lists all localities directly affected by the wall in August 2003.
- Survey of the Impact of the Separation Wall on the Socioeconomic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in which the Separation Wall Passes Through, October 2003. The sample frame is the same as for the localities survey. 695 households living east of the wall and 195 households living west of the wall were interviewed. The results from the survey were published at a press conference in October 2003 (PCBS 2003b). The localities and sample population are shown in table 6.
- The most recent Labor Force Survey has been over sampled in localities affected by the barrier, the results from this have been published.

As mentioned in the previous section and in table 2, a large number of people will be affected by the wall when it is affected, perhaps as many as 875,000. When PCBS conducted the first survey of the localities affected by the wall in August 2003, about 290,000 people lived in localities that the wall passed through or next to, see table 6.

**Table 6: Population directly being affected by the wall, by urban-rural locality, surveyed in August and October 2003**

	Total population		No. of localities	No. of households in sample
	Census 1997	Mid 2003		
East rural	62 861	80 205	49	232
East urban	142 240	183 259	16	463
West rural	19 823	25 294	11	195
West urban	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>224 924</b>	<b>288 758</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>890</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

Since the wall was far from complete in August-October 2003, it is in many ways too early to measure the effects of it. It takes time before the consequences are fully felt by the communities, households and individuals, and before they have developed coping strategies. Moreover, the barrier is not yet finished. When all of the West Bank is closed in by the barrier communication with the outside world is probably going to be even more difficult. On the other hand, it is possible but far from certain that some of the restrictions within the West Bank may be lifted, but it is a danger that the West Bank will be split into 2-3 non-contiguous areas instead of several small ghettos.

## Chapter Two

### Migration

#### 2.1: Introduction

The hardship caused by the barrier is likely to cause many people to migrate – if they have the means to do so - to another locality inside or outside the West Bank. There are many possible reasons for this:

First, some families are displaced because they live on land where the barrier is constructed or too close to the barrier. People who have lost their land or work due to the barrier may also feel compelled to move elsewhere.

Second, people who live in the closed military zone, i.e. west of the barrier, need a permanent permit to live there, which they will only get if they have ID cards for the locality they live in. Special temporary permits are required for people from other localities who want to visit the Closed Zone. People living west of the wall need special permits to travel elsewhere and some people have not been given such permits. Some of them have ID cards issued elsewhere and they do not dare to leave their homes because they are afraid that they will not be allowed to re-enter their locality. This is the case for Bedouins in one area, where the land is so fertile that they do not want to take the risk of leaving.

Third, mobility is also severely hampered for households who live east of the barrier, especially those who live in enclaves, such as Tulkarm and Qalqiliya. "The gates area closed most of the time and the Palestinians face many obstacles before getting permits to pass through the gates for their daily errands. Many farmers have great difficulties accessing their lands, with gates only open irregularly and for short periods, sometimes closed for several days. In Qalqiliya, for example, the agricultural gate in the south has been announced by IDF to be open only three times a day for 15 minutes each time, 05:30-05:45, 12:00-12:15 and 16:00-16:15, but this is often not the case. Story number 9 in Annex 1 provides another example.

Many people have great problems going to work, schools or health institutions. For example, people in Qalqiliya who work in Habla, 2 km away, now have to travel more than 25 km and they often have to wait at the checkpoint in Azzun for several hours or are not let through at all (Ha'aretz, 16 January 2004), see the map in Figure 5. Pregnant women and sick people are frequently only allowed to go to the hospital if they are travelling in an ambulance. There have been several births and some deaths at checkpoints because of this. See story number 5 in Annex 1 for an example.

Fourth, the economy in the barrier-affected areas suffers enormously because of the restrictions on transportation, travelling and agriculture. Shops have problems getting goods and the customers have problems going to the shops, both from surrounding villages and from other areas in the West Bank. In Qalqiliya 600 out of 1800 shops have already announced that they have closed or will have to close, according to the Mayor. Many farmers have lost all or most of their land and greenhouses or have difficult access to them, and wells have been destroyed or ended up on the other side of the barrier. The economic problems caused by the barrier come in addition to the serious economic setbacks on the West Bank, caused by closures of many cities and villages, checkpoints and other restrictions (World Bank 2003). It is a special problem that only cars with the yellow (Israeli) number plates are allowed to travel on some roads.

Fifth, the complex situation of identity cards and permits may make many people reconsider their place of residence. It has been mentioned, for example, that Palestinian women with Israeli citizenship married to West Bank Palestinians have great problems visiting their relatives in Israel and that the whole family may want to move to Israel, if they are allowed to do so. Many people are separated from their relatives by the wall and other restrictions, especially those living west of the wall (Table 13).

Split families are a growing phenomenon in the West Bank. One or members of the household may spend the working week (or more) at the place of work or study and only go home during weekends and vacations (or less frequently). Such moves are normally not considered to be migration in population statistics but it should nevertheless be investigated, as it may have serious implications for the family, both with regard to economy, social cohesion and gender roles. This is discussed further in the section on families and households.

Finally, it is not enough to have a strong wish to migrate, people must also have a place to migrate *to*. This is a serious problem in the West Bank, where permission is needed for entering many areas. It is virtually impossible to obtain a permission to live in Jerusalem. Moving *out* of the West Bank is also very difficult, since most countries have very strict criteria for granting residence and work permits. Also, people must have the *means* for migrating and for establishing themselves at a new place, with work, housing, etc. This implies that it is extremely difficult for the poorest to move, even if they desperately want to. Farmers are especially vulnerable in this respect since it is almost impossible to find new land for farmers who have lost all or most of their land, or whose access to land has become too restricted, due to the separation barrier.

### **Jerusalem**

Jerusalem presents a special case with its special status and the mix of Palestinians with Jerusalem and West Bank identity cards, in addition to Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and Jews, including an increasing number of settlers in the eastern part of the city. The barrier splits many communities in the middle, such as Abu Dis and Al 'Eizariya, see Figuer 6,7.

The four groups of Palestinians living in Jerusalem that will be affected very differently by the wall are:

• **Palestinians East of wall:**

- Jerusalem ID card
- West Bank ID card

• **Palestinians West of wall:**

- Jerusalem ID card
- West Bank ID card

Palestinians living *east* of the wall *with* Jerusalem ID cards will get a much longer and more complicated way to work, schools, health facilities, etc. on the other side of the wall. There may be long waiting lines at the gates. In principle they should have full access to that part of Jerusalem but it remains to be seen how well this function. Because many people in this group are afraid of losing the right to access they may want to move to the other side of the wall. This migration flow has already started and the price of apartments in East Jerusalem has increased significantly, according to Israeli sources. As many as 40,000 Palestinians may move.

For Palestinians living *east* of the wall *without* Jerusalem ID cards, their access to the part of the city where most of them work, and where their education and health services are, will become very hard. They will not be allowed to enter through the gates in the wall without special permission, which will probably be very difficult to get. They cannot choose to move to the other side of the wall either, as they do not have permission to live there.

Palestinians living *west* of the wall *with* Jerusalem ID cards should not have any problems to access work and services, as long as they keep their ID cards. They should also not have any problems crossing the wall to the east for work, services and to visit family and friends. But in recent years Israeli authorities have tried to revoke the permission of many Palestinians to live in Jerusalem. This policy has apparently been given up but it could be reinstated. There may also be some Palestinians living on the west side of the wall who will want move to the other side for political and other reasons, including a wish to live closer to relatives.

Finally, Palestinians living *west* of the wall *without* Jerusalem ID cards will have a very difficult time, since they live there illegally according to Israel and will be expelled as soon as the Israeli authorities discover it. The wall will probably make it easier for the Israeli Government to identify people who live there illegally. Thus, we can expect that most of this group will move to the other side of the wall, voluntarily or involuntarily.

**Figure 7: The wall under construction in Al ‘Eizariya, Jerusalem**



Photo: Helge Brunborg, 16 January 2004.

**2.2: Measuring migration**

It is not easy to measure the effects of the barrier on migration and mobility. First, the definitions of migration and usual place of residence are not straightforward and it is often difficult to decide if a specific move should be considered a migration or not. Second, it is difficult in general to measure migration unless there is a very good system of recording people’s moves. Third, migration is particularly difficult to measure in the West Bank, where there is a complicated system of residence ID cards and permits. Fourth, most people do not register their moves with the authorities, causing the population register to be inaccurate with regard to place of residence of the population. Fifth, migration from localities that are affected by the barrier is even more difficult to measure, for the reasons mentioned above, but also because

the barrier has been in existence for a limited period and is not complete yet. Thus, the full effects of the barrier are probably yet to be felt by the households and the society.

Emigration to other countries may in some cases be either easier measure than internal migration, in other cases or more difficult. It is easier if there is a system for registering emigrants through passports, exit permits or border crossings. If there is no such system, however, it is very difficult to obtain data about emigration, since the people who could provide such information do not live in the country any longer and would consequently not be enumerated in a survey or census. Asking neighbours or relatives is not considered a reliable source of information.

In the household survey of October 2003 five per cent of the households said that they had already changed place of residence or were planning or wanting to do this, see Table 7. This is not a high percentage but the answer to the question is difficult to interpret: First, the barrier is a new phenomenon, not yet finished, and many households have not yet felt the full impact of it or have not yet learned how to cope with it and may decide to move later. Second, we do not know how many of the respondents who have already moved and how many who only *intend* to move. Intentions or wishes to do something do not necessarily mean that the respondents are actually going to do it. Third, it not clear whether the question captures wishes, intentions or plans to move. Fourth, we do not know over what period people are intending to move. If it is over a short period of, say, one or two months, it would be a very high proportion, but if it is over a five-year period, it would be very low. Fifth, the question is only directed to the head of the household (or another adult). Consequently, we do not know if the whole household or only some if its members intend to move. It would be interesting to know which household members are thinking most about departing: the young or the old, men or women, for work or study.

**Table 7: Distribution of households by changed or intended change of place of residence by location relative to the separation wall. Percent**

Change of Place of Residence	Total	Location relative to the Separation Wall	
		East of the Wall	West of the Wall
Changed or will change	4.9	4.9	5.0
Not changed/ Will not change	95.1	95.1	95.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

We would expect that households west of the barrier would be more anxious to change their place of residence because their freedom to move has become much more restricted by the barrier, but this does not seem to be the case. The proportion is 5.0 per cent to the west of the barrier and 4.9 per cent to the east of the barrier (Table 7), a statistically insignificant difference. Five percent of the households in the localities directly affected by the wall in August 2003 are approximately 15,000 people. If the same percentage of the maximum estimate of the number of people affected move, 875,713 (Table:1 in PCBS 2003a), there will be about 44,000 migrants.

A possible explanation of the minimal difference in the intention to move between people living on each side of the wall may be that people who live to the west of the wall have decided not to move for political (and personal) reasons, because they fear that their land would

be taken over by Israel if they leave it, in spite of the hardship they experience. It is also possible that they think that it may be advantageous to live close to Israel because it may be easier for them to get work in Israel and permission to cross the Green Line. There may even be people living on the other side of the wall who may think the same and wish to move to the western side of the wall – although it will probably be very difficult to obtain permission to do so. See story number 4 in Annex 1 for an example.

Part of the explanation for a possible reluctance to move for households living west of the wall is that they are slightly better off than households living east of the wall. They own their own dwelling and a private car and other household goods more often than households living east of the wall, see table 8.

**Table 8: Type and ownership of housing, and availability of durable goods for Palestinian Households. Percent**

Type of Housing Unit	Total	Location relative to Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
Living in a villa	1.5	1.1	5.4
Living in a house	50.2	48.9	64.2
Owning housing unit	80.0	79.2	88.1
Availability of:			
Private car	24.2	23.5	32.4
Mobile telephone	59.6	58.6	69.8
Video	19.3	19.0	23.4
Satellite antenna	53.6	52.9	61.1


Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

The relative affluence of households living west of the wall will probably change in the future, however, since they are much harder hit by restrictions than households on the eastern side of the wall.

**2.3: Reasons for wanting to move**

When asked about the *reason* for intending to change place of residence, factors related to the Israeli measures are prominent, see the black bars in Figure 8 (from table 15 in PCBS 2003a). (Note that the respondents could give more than one reason for wanting to change place of residence.) The most frequently mentioned reason for wanting to change place of residence was ‘Moving difficulties’, which was mentioned by fully 72 per cent of these households. Most other frequent reasons for wanting to move were also related to Israeli measures, except for ‘Work’, which was mentioned by 48 per cent (but which could also be related to the worsened economic situation due to the barrier and other Israel’s policies). The other such reasons are ‘Lack of security (fear)’, ‘Separation wall’, ‘House destruction’ (26 per cent), and ‘Other Israeli measures’. Common reasons for moving under normal conditions were mentioned rather infrequently, such as ‘Study’ (17 per cent) and ‘Marriage’ (14 per cent).

**Figure 8: Percentage of households intending to change place of residence by priority of reason for changing**



Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

The reasons for wanting to move are, of course, closely related to the households' experience. Table 9 shows that a large number of households are facing serious restrictions in their movements, because of time-consuming checkpoints, inconvenient opening hours, and requirement for special permissions, IDs, etc. Quite a few households have also had their house partly or totally destroyed (Table 11), but only a few of them because of construction of the wall (table 12).

**Table 9: Households facing movement restrictions**

Restrictions to Move Around	Total	Location relative to Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
Time Spent to Pass	81.7	80.7	93.1
Timing of Passage	60.1	57.4	89.6
Crossing Conditions (Permission, ID Cards)	62.1	61.0	74.1
Others	1.6	1.4	3.7

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

## 2.4: Displacements

As mentioned above some people have been displaced by the wall because they lived too close to it. This is a special case of migration, called forced migration or internal displacement (IP). In August 2003 PCBS conducted a "Survey on the Impact of Separation Wall on the Localities Where it Passed Through", covering all the 76 localities that had been affected so far. The survey found that 402 households with a total of 2,323 persons had been displaced "due to separation wall", which is 0.8 per cent of the population living in the areas affected by the wall at the time of the survey. The number of males and females was about the same, 1,138 males and 1,185 females (PCBS 2003a).

It is expected that many more people will be displaced by the wall and the security zone around to it, as the construction progresses.

**Table 10: Number of displaced households and persons in localities directly affected by the wall, by Governorate**

Governorate/ Region	Number of Persons			Number of Households
	Total	Female	Male	
Jenin	664	326	338	113
Tulkarm	422	229	193	59
Qalqiliya	600	250	350	100
Salfit	0	0	0	0
Jerusalem	637	380	257	130
Bethlehem	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2323</b>	<b>1185</b>	<b>1138</b>	<b>402</b>

Source: PCBS Locality Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, August 2003.



## Household structure and social relations

### 3.1: Introduction

The separation wall may affect family and household structure in several ways, both directly and indirectly. The indirect effects are caused by the general hardship and the worsening of living conditions, which for some households have become acute through loss of housing or employment, lower income from farming or family business, more time and money required for commuting and other travel, and household members having to live elsewhere.

In this report we will consider three direct effects of the wall on households and families:

- Destruction of homes
- Split families due to temporary or permanent change of place of residence for some family members due to the problems of commuting to work or school.
- Worsening of social relations

### 3.2: Destruction of homes

Construction of the wall and the “security” zone around it is expected to lead to demolishing of some houses. The household survey of October 2003 reported that 29.1 percent of the housing units had been destroyed due to the Israeli measures, including construction of the wall, 30.1 percent east of the wall and 19.3 percent west of the wall (see Table 11). These figures include both partially and totally destroyed buildings, however, and are not restricted to damage caused by the separation wall itself. Thus, these figures do not tell us how many houses were destroyed due to the construction of the wall. So far the barrier has mostly been constructed in rural areas and usually follows roads in urban areas.

**Table 11: Destroyed or partially damaged residential buildings due to the wall**

Destruction	Total	Location relative to Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
Totally destroyed	1.3	1.4	0.8
Partly destroyed	27.8	28.7	18.5
Not destroyed	70.9	69.9	80.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

The locality survey recorded the number, area and value of houses that were destroyed because of the construction of the wall, and found that 10 buildings were totally destroyed and 14 partially destroyed, most of them in Jenin, see table 12. On the other hand, the construction of the barrier was not completed when the survey was done, especially in urban and densely populated areas such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah. Thus, we can expect that more houses will be destroyed as the construction progresses. Completion of the depth barrier will probably also lead to more demolitions.

**Table 12: Destroyed or partially damaged residential buildings due to the wall, by Governorate**

Governorate/ Region	Number of destroyed or damaged buildings			Destroyed or damaged area of buildings (m <sup>2</sup> )			Estimated value of destroyed or damaged buildings (1000 US\$)		
	Total	Partially	Totally	Total	Partially	Totally	Total	Partially	Totally
Jenin	20	14	6	910	260	650	163	52	111
Tulkarm	3	0	3	135	0	135	15	0	15
Qalqiliya	1	0	1	25	0	25	3	0	3
Salfit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jerusalem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bethlehem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1070</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>810</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>129</b>

Source: PCBS Locality Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, August 2003.

### 3.3: Split families

Split families are becoming more common in the West Bank due to movement restrictions. One or more members of the household may spend the working week (or more) at the place of work or study and only go home during weekends and vacations (or less frequently). To avoid the humiliation, time use and unpredictability, many people, usually the male head of household, live in a rented room, a hotel or with friends at the place of work during the week, and commute to the family on weekends or less frequently. This is probably the case for thousands of workers in public and private institutions. There is, for example, one government institution in Ramallah with more than one hundred employees living apart from their families during the week. There are also many students who used to live in the parental home but who have been more or less forced to live at their place of study.

Such temporary living arrangements will increase household expenditure on housing and food for the persons(s) staying elsewhere, leaving less for the women and children at home. These arrangements may also have implications for the family, with regard to cohesion and gender roles. Many children will have little contact with their father and be left on their own for long periods if the mother is working; there may be an increase in divorce because of the separation and also perhaps because of temptations at the place of work. The women will be playing a more important, but also a tougher and more demanding role. Unfortunately, there are no data on this.

### 3.4: Movement restrictions and social relations

There are no comprehensive data on the consequences of the wall for household structure, but the Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall enquired about separation from relatives, the ability to see them, restrictions on moving, especially for women, and the choice of marriage partner (see Table 13).

Almost 40 per cent of the households have one or more members who are separated from their relatives because of the wall (see Table 13). This is caused by the separation wall going through or between communities, and probably also because the wall has made it very difficult to visit relatives due to time-consuming gates and checkpoints and longer distances to travel. A household in the city of Qalqiliya, for example, would probably feel separated both

from relatives living in the village Ras at Tira, which is *west* of the wall, but also from relatives in the enclaved village ‘Azzun ‘Atma, which is *east* of the wall, see the map in Figure 5.

**Table 13: Household members separated from relatives because of the separation wall. Percent of households**

All or some household members separated from relatives	Total	Location relative to wall	
		East of wall	West of wall
Separated	38.5	37.3	50.9
Not separated	61.5	62.7	49.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

It should in principle be easier for people living west of the wall to visit relatives to the east than vice versa, since people living in the east will need special permits to enter the Closed Zone. On the other hand, households living west of the wall may feel more separated from their relatives than those living on the other side, because they have more checkpoints to cross and because they require special residence permits. Also, the fact that the number of people living west of the wall is relatively small will automatically isolate them more than people on the east side. (A hypothetical example illustrates this: If there were only *one* household left east of the wall, 100 percent of the population would be isolated from its relatives.) Table 13 shows that this is indeed the case. The proportion of households with separated relatives is 51 percent to the west of the wall and 37 percent on the other side of the wall.

The household survey does not ask any special questions about *how* difficult it is to visit relatives, but it asks if the separation wall is affecting social activities (Table 14). We see that 66 percent of the households feel that the wall affects their ability to visit relatives. This is much higher than the percentage that is *separated* from their relatives (39 percent, see Table 13). To the west of the wall virtually all households (91 percent) say that the wall affects their ability to visit relatives. Table 14 also shows that the wall affects the ability to practice cultural, social and entertainment activities for the majority of households, such as going to weddings and funerals, attending lectures and workshops, going to libraries, cinemas, theatres, football matches, etc. Again, the households living west of the wall are the hardest hit, see the example of Ras at Tira in Annex 1. Religious activities are probably not affected by a large number of people, since most communities have a mosque (or a church). There is one highly significant exception to this, however, which is the inability of most people on the West Bank to visit the holy places in Jerusalem.

**Table 14: Effects on Social Activities. Percent of households**

Type of Activity	Total	Location relative to Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
Ability to visit relatives	65.8	63.5	90.6
Cultural and social activities	51.4	48.4	83.3
Entertainment activities	61.1	59.1	82.5
Others	0.8	0.9	-

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

The household survey does not inquire about *how* difficult it is to visit relatives, but it asks a question in general about restrictions on movement. This question does not seem to be related to the separation wall only, however. Table 15 shows that for more than 80 percent of the households the time to pass gates and checkpoints, etc. is restricting travelling. The timing of passage, meaning when the gates and checkpoints are open, is also a restriction for the majority of households. The same is the case for the crossing conditions, i.e. requirement for permissions, ID cards, etc. These restrictions are the most serious for households living on the western side of the wall, where almost all households feel that their ability to move around has become very restricted.

**Table 15: Restrictions on movement. Percent of households**

Type of Restriction	Total	Location relative to Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
Time spent to pass	81.7	80.7	93.1
Timing of passage	60.1	57.4	89.6
Crossing conditions (permission, ID Cards)	62.1	61.0	74.1
Others	1.6	1.4	3.7

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

The Locality Survey in August 2003 recorded the number of localities where movement was difficult because of the wall. Of the 76 localities that the wall passed through, fully 59 had problems with the time to pass the gates and 37 had problems with the timing of the passage table 16.

**Table16: Localities where people face movement restrictions, by Governorate**

Governorate	Type of Restriction			
	Time Spent to Pass	Timing of Passage	Moving/Crossing Conditions	Other
Jenin	11	8	5	7
Tulkarm	18	3	0	15
Qalqiliya	19	16	8	2
Salfit	1	0	0	1
Jerusalem	7	7	6	1
Bethlehem	3	3	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>26</b>

Source: PCBS Locality Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, August 2003.

The sheer existence of the wall, with gates that are often closed, as well as numerous checkpoints and other restrictions, means that it has become impossible to have frequent contact with relatives and other people who live in a “wrong” location. For many people this is a serious impairment of the quality of life. Imagine a man (or woman) who can only rarely visit his mother, or grandparents who are unable to see their grandchildren regularly.

Palestinians have traditionally found spouses over a large area and have not been limited to nearby villages, as in some societies. The wall seems to be changing this, see Table 17. The interpretation of this table is that before the wall was constructed, 14.4 percent of the house-

holds found it problematic for a person to marry a person living in the area that later ended up on the other side of the wall. The wall increased this proportion to fully 50.4 percent. Interestingly, the percentage is the same for households on both sides of the wall. This shows that the wall will probably also affect the marriage pattern. This is particularly problematic for the relatively small population living west of the wall, which does not have so many marriage candidates to choose amongst.

**Table 17: Perception of marrying a person living in the other side of the wall. Percent of households**

Households Perception	Total		East of Wall		West of Wall	
	After Wall	Before Wall	After Wall	Before Wall	After Wall	Before Wall
Obstacles	50.4	14.4	50.4	14.9	50.4	8.2
No Obstacles	49.6	85.6	49.6	85.1	49.6	91.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

Several observers have mentioned that the separation wall could be particularly restrictive on the freedom for women to move around. This question was addressed by the Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall. Table 18 shows that the wall affects the movement of almost all women, 78 percent, especially women living west of the wall, where the proportion is fully 87 percent. The reduced ability for women to move is particularly harmful for female students, who need to commute to their school or university. It would be a great setback for the role of Palestinian women if their educational activity and attainment were impaired. 12 percent of students have so far moved, see Table 23.

**Table 18: Movement of women to and from the place of residence. Percent of households**

Impact of wall on movement of women, incl. female students	Total	Location relative to wall	
		East of wall	West of wall
Movement decreased	78.1	77.4	86.5
Movement increased	1.0	1.1	0.7
No change	20.9	21.5	12.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003



## Chapter Four

### Access to services

#### 4.1: Introduction

In the same way as the wall has restricted movement, the access to services has been impaired for many people. The difficulties in accessing health services, schools and universities are reported later (Table 21 – Table 23). However, the *distance* to public transportation and various health and educational institutions is not much greater than before the wall was constructed, at least for households living east of the wall, see Table 19. Most households have a slightly longer way to medical centres (but not to private clinics) and hospitals, as measured by the proportion of households with a distance of 1 km or more. 48 per cent of the households are now living more than 5 km away from the hospital, against 45 percent before the barrier was constructed.

**Table 19: Distance to services before and after the wall for households living east of the wall. Percent of households**

Type of Service	After construction of wall				Before construction of wall			
	Total	Distance			Total	Distance		
		5 km or more	1-4 km	Less than 1 km		5 km or more	1-4 km	Less than 1 km
Public Transportation	100	0.2	9.7	90.1	100	-	9.8	90.2
Private Clinic	100	2.4	22.4	75.2	100	2.0	25.2	72.8
Medical Center	100	2.8	20.7	76.5	100	2.4	24.6	73.0
Private or public hospital	100	48.3	20.5	31.2	100	45.0	25.6	29.4
Elementary School	100	0.4	14.7	84.9	100	0.4	16.6	83.0
Secondary School	100	0.4	24.7	74.9	100	0.5	27.3	72.2
Kindergarten	100	0.3	13.5	86.2	100	0.3	15.4	84.3
Mother and child health centre	100	2.6	21.6	75.8	100	2.7	25.3	72.0

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the impact of the separation wall, October 2003.

The situation has become particularly bad for households living *west* of the wall, see Table 20. The most striking result is that the distance to public transportation has increased substantially: 25 percent of the households now have more than 1 km to public transportation, against 16 percent previously, and 8.4 percent have more than 5 km to public transportation, against only 1.5 percent before the wall was constructed. The distance to health centres has become slightly longer. The effects seem to be the largest for the distance to schools. Quite a few households now have more than 5 km to both elementary and secondary schools.

**Table 20: Distance to services before and after the wall for households living west of the wall. Percent of households**

Type of Service	After construction of wall				Before construction of wall			
	Total	Distance			Total	Distance		
		5 km or more	1-4 km	Less than 1 km		5 km or more	1-4 km	Less than 1 km
Public Transportation	100	8.4	16.6	75.0	100	1.5	14.1	84.4
Private Clinic	100	25.8	25.5	48.7	100	21.7	30.3	48.0
Medical Centre	100	30.0	27.8	42.2	100	27.3	33.2	39.5
Private or public hospital	100	80.1	16.8	3.1	100	80.7	16.9	2.4
Elementary School	100	8.3	13.5	78.2	100	5.9	14.2	79.9
Secondary School	100	28.4	27.2	44.4	100	25.8	31.9	42.3
Kindergarten	100	10.1	15.4	74.5	100	8.3	20.4	71.3
Mother and child health clinic	100	26.6	28.9	44.5	100	21.9	35.7	42.4

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

The distance to services in itself is not the only aspect that matters – time use and restrictions on the access are more important. It does not help much if the health centre is situated only one km away, but on the other side of the wall or a checkpoint, with short and irregular opening hours of the gate, and perhaps a need for a special permission to pass.

The *time* to reach the health service is often very important, especially for doctors, nurses, and not the least patients. Several women have delivered at checkpoints and some patients have died because it took too long to reach the health service.

Completion of the wall in Jerusalem is likely to lead to a large increase in the distance to services for many households. Those most affected will be Palestinians living east of the wall, with permits to live in Jerusalem, as discussed above. They should, in principle, have the right to use public services in Jerusalem, also after the wall has been constructed, but many will have to travel long distances from their homes to the nearest gate, wait for checking at the gate, and then go from the gate to the clinic, school or other service they require.

#### **4.2: Health**

The wall is expected to affect the health sector in several ways, the most important being:

- Reduced access to health services, for both patients and health personnel.
- Health problems, including deaths, because of long waiting times (or closures) at gates and checkpoints.
- Deteriorating health due to lack of medical supplies and treatment.
- Deteriorating health because of reduced ability to pay for treatment and medicines due to deteriorating economic conditions and increasing poverty.

The first two factors may affect reproductive health in particular, especially through the difficulties facing pregnant women going to the hospital to deliver. Delays at checkpoints have caused several women (more than 50, it is reported) to deliver at the checkpoint, some times with fatal consequences for the baby and the mother.

The wall is affecting the access of many households to health services, because they now live on the other side of the wall. Moreover, access has been made more difficult through longer distances and the need to pass gates and checkpoints. Table 20 shows that the average distance to health facilities increased somewhat, especially for households living west of the wall, but not alarmingly much. Table 21 shows that 42 percent of the households answered that the remoteness of health centres is a problem, especially on the western side of the wall, where this is reported by fully 74 percent. It is possible that the feeling of remoteness includes difficult access to health facilities because of the wall and other restrictions.

**Table 21: Problems with Access to Health Services. Percent of households**

Type of Obstacle	Total	Location relative to Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
Remoteness of health centres	41.6	38.6	73.7
Inability for medical staff to reach health centers	42.6	39.4	76.4
Inability to pay costs	59.6	58.8	69.3
Lack of medicines and other essential medical needs	44.0	41.9	65.9
Lack of equipment	38.0	35.8	62.5
Lack of child health care services	28.0	24.7	63.7
Lack of maternal care services	25.3	21.7	65.0
Others	1.8	1.7	3.3

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the impact of the separation wall, October 2003.

Medical personnel have increasing difficulties in reaching their place of work. Table 21 shows that 43 percent of the households report that this is a problem. Again, the problem is much more serious on the western side of the wall where more than two thirds of the households report this, twice as frequent as in the east. The reason for this is probably that many of the health workers live on the eastern side and face difficulties entering the western side.

However, the most frequently reported obstacle caused by the wall for the access to the health service is ‘Inability to pay costs’, which is mentioned by 59 per cent of the interviewed households living east of the wall and 69 per cent of those living west of the wall. Lack of medicines and other medical supplies is also a common problem, especially to the west of the wall. Finally, a large group, two thirds of households living west of the wall, report that there is a lack of childcare and maternal mortality services.

It is difficult to say whether the access problems will deteriorate further in the future, after the wall has been completed and been operating for some time. It is possible that Israel will improve the routines for keeping the gates open and do the checking. There is growing information and awareness about the problems for the Palestinians caused by the wall, both in Israel and internationally. The checking itself may perhaps also be done more professionally and not by young and untrained soldiers, preferably by civilians (B’Tselem 2003). Women may be more readily available at the checkpoint to search female Palestinians. It is also possible that new health facilities will be established in areas where residents now have difficult access to them, especially to the west of the wall, but this would place an additional economic burden on PNA.

On the other hand, the economic conditions may very well deteriorate further in the years to come, partly as a result of the wall. This will affect the access to health services negatively. Moreover, there currently seems to be little hope for an improvement of the political situation and an accompanying reduction in the restrictions on travel, etc., at least in the immediate future.

We have discussed the effects of the wall on the access to health services. Although long waiting times at check points, and more time-consuming and costly travel, are frustrating and humiliating, it remains to be seen if the worsened access to health services will have any significant effects on the health of the Palestinian population. The economic development in the West Bank may be more important for the overall health status of the Palestinian population than the wall itself. This makes it difficult to separate the effects of poor economic development and restrictions in general in the West Bank, from the effects caused by the wall itself. But it is nevertheless important to monitor the health status of the population, including morbidity and mortality measures, and to identify the effects of the wall.

### **4.3: Education**

Some of the problems caused by the wall for education are the same as for the health sector: Difficult access to services for both users (clients) and staff (providers). The economic development is also be important, both for the ability of the households to pay for the costs of education (books, travel, tuition fees, etc), and for the ability of the Palestinian authority to pay for teachers, maintenance of existing schools and construction of new buildings, etc.

However, education does not have the emergency aspect that usually characterizes health problems. For most users contact with the health sector is rather infrequent, but for education it is the other way around: There are usually no emergencies (except during exams, perhaps) - it is the regular daily work that counts. If this is frequently interrupted or disturbed the quality of the education will suffer, but this is will only become visible after some time. Thus, the human capital, which is the most important resource of the Palestinian people, may suffer in the long run.

There are already signs of frequent interruptions in the daily schedule for both students and teachers. Absence due to closed checkpoints or long waiting hours at the checkpoints is common in some areas, e.g. in Qalqiliya, where some teachers have to travel more than 25 km and pass a checkpoint which is some times closed or takes several hours to pass through, against a 5-10 minute ride previously. Table 22 shows that there are some students living east of the wall who have difficulties arriving at their school (14 percent), but the percentage is more than twice as high (29 percent) for students living west of the wall. It is, however, even more serious when the *teachers* cannot make it to school on time, since this affects a whole class of students. Table 22 shows that almost half of the teachers living east of the wall (43 percent) and three quarters (75 percent) of teachers living west of the wall have difficulties going to their school or university. This will gradually affect the quality of the education.

**Table 22: Absence from school or university. Percent of households with children in primary or secondary school or university**

Type of problem	Total	Location relative to Separation Wall	
		East of Wall	West of Wall
Difficult for students to arrive at school/university	15.2	13.9	29.4
Difficult for teachers to arrive at school/university	45.3	42.5	74.6
Costs of travelling to school/university	16.2	15.4	24.7
Enrolment in preferred secondary school	5.3	4.9	9.2

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the impact of the separation wall, October 2003.

There are several ways of coping with the problems caused by the wall, as shown in and one way is to use alternative roads, which is a coping method for 46 percent of the students in primary and secondary schools, 56 percent of the students at university, 33 percent of the schoolteachers, and 42 percent of the university teachers. (Actually, the percentage is of households with children in school or university who have difficulties arriving at their place of learning.) It takes, however, longer time and costs more money to use alternative roads than the road that normally would have been taken without any restrictions, which takes time away from schoolwork besides being a strain on the household economy. We also note that it is common to use savings, receive assistance or borrow money for education-related expenses related to the wall. Special coordination, where the school or mayor gives a list of the names of students and teachers to IDF to be used at the checkpoints, is not very common.

**Table 23: Coping methods for attending school for students and teachers. Percent of households with children at school, whose children or teachers have difficulties arriving at school**

Coping Method	Percent
<b>For students</b>	
Using Alternative Roads	45.9
Dropout	1.0
Changing School	7.6
Changing Place of Residence	2.4
Using Permits, or Special Coordination	-
Borrowed Money	43.9
Received Assistance	10.9
Used savings	38.7
Enrolled at Available Branch in Locality	93.4
Forced to change place of residence to enrol in preferred (needed) branch	3.4
<b>For teachers</b>	
Using Alternative Roads	32.8
Changing School	4.9
Changing Place of Residence	1.9
Using permits, special cards, or special coordinating	8.3

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the impact of the separation wall, October 2003.

and show that there are few dropouts because of the wall may be all of them are school students living west of the wall. As shown in Table 22, however, there are quite a few secondary school students who cannot attend the stream (or branch) they would like to, 5 percent east of the wall and 9 per cent west of the wall. They feel forced to attend the school in the locality where they live and to study other subjects than they would have preferred, for example, science instead of literature. Only a few (about 3 percent) of the secondary school students have moved because of this.

In the West Bank parents prefer their children to live with them and to attend local universities and schools. This is becoming increasingly difficult, due to the travel restrictions caused by the wall, closures and checkpoints. Many students have chosen to change university or their place of residence, as shown in below, leading to a more restricted choice of studies, less contact between parents and children, and higher educational costs. The consequence of this is that not so many can afford to get higher education and this may affect women in particular.

**Table 24: Coping methods for attending universities and other higher education for students and teachers. Percent of households with children at university, whose children or teachers have difficulties arriving at school or university**

Coping Method	Percentage
<b>For students</b>	
Using alternative roads	56.2
Changing university	6.9
Changing Place of Residence	12.0
Using Permits, or Special Coordination	2.9
Borrowed Money	40.7
Received Assistance	16.8
Used their Saving	39.1
<b>For teachers</b>	
Using Alternative Roads	41.7
Changing Teachers University	1.0
Changing Place of Residence	5.7
Using permits, or special cards, or special coordinating	5.2

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.

When there is a closure there is no other coping method than to be absent from school. This is very common, see Table 25, especially for those living west of the wall, for well above half of students and teachers. We do not know, however, how *often* this has been happening. If it is frequent, the quality of the education is definitely going to deteriorate.

**Table 25: Absence from school or university due to closure. Percent of households with children in school (primary or secondary) or university, whose children or teachers have difficulties arriving at school or university**

<b>Absence from school or university</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>East of Wall</b>	<b>West of Wall</b>
<b>School students</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>28.9</b>	<b>72.8</b>
<b>University students</b>	<b>21.5</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>58.7</b>
<b>School teachers</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>65.3</b>
<b>University teachers</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>45.8</b>	<b>51.0</b>

Source: PCBS Household Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall, October 2003.



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# **Annexes**



## **Annex 1: Observers' reports/examples on daily suffering in areas near the wall**

### **1. An example of social cohesion**

In the village of Jayyus more than 8,500 dunams were isolated in an enclave and an additional 500 dunams of agricultural land was shovelled away. A certain farmer has 200 dunams of olive trees uprooted. He approached his neighbour to allow him to replant the uprooted trees in the latter's land to keep them alive. Not only did the neighbour agree, but he also insisted to register the land where the trees were replanted in the name of the affected farmer. With all the hardships facing Palestinian society this is an example that social cohesion and solidarity is still there.

### **2. The farmer that lost his eyesight**

A sixty-year old farmer in 'Azzun had started his life as a roaming vendor on a camel. After saving some money he managed to purchase a piece of land where he planted some olive trees that he nurtured for years. The oil yield was marketed through a grocery in Qalqiliya providing his main source of income. With the warrants passed over to the farmers informing them about the land confiscations to erect the wall, this farmer's blood pressure increased causing a serious problem with his eyesight. According to an Israeli ophthalmic hospital 15,000 shekels are needed as costs to operate his eye. With the total loss of income from the confiscated land, the only asset the farmer has is his house that he has to sell and see his irrecoverable loss.

### **3. The road from Bethlehem to Larnaca**

One of the stories that reflect the tremendous hardship of moving from one area to another between towns and villages after the erection of the wall has to do with an incident that occurred in the Bethlehem area. A Palestinian parent accompanied his daughter to the Jordanian borders to join her husband. The couple then flew to Larnaka, Cyprus, and called the family in Bethlehem to inform them of their safe arrival. The father had not managed to arrive home in Bethlehem yet while the daughter and her spouse had reached Cyprus.

### **4. Earning Bread**

The head of a household that comprises a spouse and four children has been totally separated from his family that lives in Tura al Gharbiya inside the Green Line. The spouse is from Israel proper and her husband lost his residence permit that the authorities refused to renew resulting in his staying outside the wall at a distance of 500 meters from his family with no access to them. As a result the family became dependent on social welfare after the loss of the family's breadwinner.

### **5. Loss of Life**

Most residents left out to the west of the wall have no access to health facilities and depend largely on the towns in their areas. The gates that have been installed and the restrictions in passing through within curfew hours seriously impede movement in emergency cases and for those suffering from chronic cases. In addition there has been recurrent obstruction of ambulance cars dealing with the emergency cases. The policy of the army in controlling movement through the gates has become systematic in depriving Palestinians of their basic rights of having access to health facilities. Such a policy resulted in death cases. An example is a six-year old child boy from Habla village who arrived to the gate when it was locked suffering from a heart ailment on November 26, 2003. The guards refused to let him through causing his death. A similar case resulted in the death of a nine-month old boy from the 'Arab ar Ramadin who was not allowed through on December 7, 2003 or having an ambulance. The family tried to

move through a long bypass mountain road on a donkey. The child passed away before getting to the hospital.

## **6. Problems with access to schools**

The educational life is seriously disrupted as a result of the arbitrary closure of gates with students and teachers missing early classes and being compelled to leave school earlier in order to make it to the gates before closing hours. An example is the case of students from the village of Ras at Tira in the Qalqiliya district, which accommodates the secondary level students from the village of Habla. These students have to go on foot for four kilometres in each direction to and from school. With no permission to allow any vehicles on this road, the pupils are exhausted and drained out. As a result of the whims in the mood of soldiers manning the gates, there are regular delays for teachers to arrive on time both in areas to the west of the wall or outside it. Female pupils and instructors have further problems in that they are kept waiting until female soldiers, that are not readily available, arrive to undergo the checking. In many cases female teachers are compelled to return home after losing most of the day waiting at the gates. There are also cases when instructors were deprived from permits to head to their schools outside their area of residence such as the case of the school in Dab'a village. Clearly there is a deliberate policy of hindering opening the gates on specific hours and causing delays in searching thus undermining the movement of teachers and students to and from their schools.

## **7. Watch Your Olives But Don't Touch**

A villager from Shweika tried day after day to harvest his olives during the season. The soldiers kept preventing him, while he was watching his olives mellow day after day. When the olives started to fall from the trees and rot he was allowed in, but with no means of transportation. This is a case of the daily psychological torture that Palestinian farmers undergo.

## **8. The Sorrow of a Mother**

The family composed of a mother and her two sons in Izbat Salman headed to work in a plastic house in their land that has been confiscated for the segregation wall. At the end of the day they mounted a donkey-driven carriage on their way home. On the way, an Israeli truck carrying material for the construction of the wall as well as two pre-fabricated houses knocked them down. As a result her 17-year old senior son died while she and her younger son suffered serious injuries and were taken to hospital. Even the donkey was not spared from the ruthless occupation and was killed. Eyewitnesses report that the older son's body was torn into pieces while the mother was in a state of coma. When she awakened and knew about what happened, she had a nervous breakdown and is still being treated by a neurologist.

## **9. Examples of the situation in two isolated villages in Qalqiliya Governorate**

### **9.1 Izbat Salman**

- This is one of the isolated and encircled villages through the segregation wall with 600 people depending on agriculture (vegetables, greenhouses and groves). Most of the village land is beyond the wall.
- Two gates were installed for agricultural purposes, numbered 39 and 40. To reach these gates, the farmers have to go on foot a distance of four kilometers while agricultural tools are not allowed in.
- The Israeli Army allow crossing through these gates from 6:20 to 6:30 am, and from 7:10 to 7:50 am. In the evening this is allowed only from 13:20 to 13:30 and from 17:15 to 17:30. On Sabbath, Jewish holidays and during security closures, the gates are com-

pletely locked. Even with the limited announced opening hours, there are often delays, forcing villagers to wait on their way to or from their fields.

- Out of 94 permit applications from the villagers, only 41 permits were approved allowing movement only through gate 40. The rejection was claimed to be for security reasons, meaning that more than half of the farmers are deprived from access to their only source of livelihood.
- As a result of the wall and delays in handling the permits (that were distributed on December 19, 2003), most groves suffered from drying up as a result of lack of irrigation, with the products rotting. The ban on bringing in transportation means and agricultural tools exacerbates matters and impedes carrying agricultural products to the markets.

## **9.2 Ras at Tira**

- This is a village with a population of 370 that are totally isolated within the wall. More than 60% work in Israel, 10% in agriculture and 30% in commerce and public posts. Part of the village land is isolated outside the wall.
- The village may be accessed through three gates: Gate #33 between Ras at Tira and Habla, Gate #31 at Izbat Jal'ud and Gate #36 at the village of Kafr Thulth.
- The villagers have access only to gates 31 and 33 while gate 36 is restricted to the Israeli army and guards.
- Access to the gates is confined to 7 to 8 am, noon to 13, and in the evening from 16:00 to 17:00. On Sabbaths, Jewish holidays and during security closures, the gates are completely closed.
- The village lacks any clinic or health facilities. Access to hospitals in emergency cases is very problematic. One of the villagers had a son suffering from an ailment. He headed to the gate at the time when it was closed. The soldiers refused to allow him through despite the serious condition of the child. Only after he left the child at the gate and claimed he was returning home alone was he allowed through. Another four-year old boy was suffering from a chest ailment and required emergency treatment. He was not allowed through, forcing the family to resort to traditional means of treatment. Another child, who suffered from a cold fit and throat infection with high temperature, was not allowed through. Finally a doctor was summoned from the other side and gave her an injection through the bars of the locked gate.
- The secondary level pupils from Ras at Tira go to school in Habla and need to cross the gate on a daily basis. However, with frequent delays in the opening of the gate, they often miss the early classes after having gone on foot a distance of four kilometers. On their way back they often have to miss the afternoon classes in order to make it to the gate on time. Their only options are to cross at 13:00 or wait until 16:00 pm when the gate is supposed to reopen.



**Annex 2: List of localities directly being affected by the wall, by Governorate, surveyed in August and October 2003**

Governorate/ District	Locality	Locality Type	Location relative to wall	Population, Census 1997	Estimated population, mid-year 2003	Number of households in sample (unweighted)
Jenin	Zububa	rural	east	1585	2015	0
	Rummana	rural	east	2516	3198	12
	At Tayba	rural	east	1780	2263	0
	'Arabbuna	rural	east	638	811	0
	Al Jalama	rural	east	1719	2185	0
	'Anin	rural	east	2775	3527	15
	Umm ar Rihan	rural	west	279	355	15
	Khirbet 'Abdallah al Yunis	rural	west	105	133	0
	Dhaher al Malih	rural	west	162	206	0
	Barta'a ash Sharqiya	rural	west	2688	3417	29
	Al 'Araqa	rural	east	1585	2015	16
	Khirbet ash Sheikh Sa'eed	rural	west	163	207	0
	Tura al Gharbiya	rural	east	828	1052	0
	Tura ash Sharqiya	rural	east	135	172	0
	Nazlat ash Sheikh Zeid	rural	east	544	691	0
	Khirbet al Muntar al Gharbiya	rural	west	25	0	0
	Jalbun	rural	east	1860	2364	16
	Khirbet Mas'ud	rural	east	46	0	0
	Al Khuljan	rural	east	363	461	0
	Dhaher al 'Abed	rural	east	277	352	0
Al Mughayyir	rural	east	1671	2124	15	
<b>Total Jenin</b>				<b>21744</b>	<b>27549</b>	<b>118</b>
Tulkarm	'Akkaba	rural	east	195	248	0
	Qaffin	rural	east	6525	8294	27
	Nazlat 'Isa	rural	west	1868	2375	27
	Baqa ash Sharqiya	rural	west	3055	3883	46
	An Nazla al Wusta	rural	east	310	394	0
	Nazlat Abu Nar	rural	west	146	186	0
	An Nazla al Gharbiya	rural	east	661	840	0
	Zeita	rural	east	2346	2982	14
	'Illar	rural	east	5135	6527	13
	'Attil	urban	east	7763	9868	26
	Deir al Ghusun	urban	east	7061	8976	11
	Al Jarushiya	rural	east	677	861	13
	Dhinnaba	rural	east	6297	8005	14

Governorate/ District	Locality	Locality Type	Location relative to wall	Population, Census 1997	Estimated population, mid-year 2003	Number of households in sample (unweighted)
	Tulkarm	urban	east	33949	43155	121
	'Izbat Abu Khameish	rural	east	37	0	0
	Khirbet at Tayyah	rural	east	260	331	0
	'Izbat al Khilal	rural	east	69	0	0
	Kafa	rural	east	260	331	0
	'Izbat Shufa	rural	east	736	936	0
	Far'un	rural	east	2382	3028	0
	Khirbet Jubara	rural	west	244	310	0
	Ar Ras	rural	east	378	481	0
	Kafr Sur	rural	east	936	1190	0
	Kafr Zibad	rural	east	975	1239	0
	Kafr Jammal	rural	east	1907	2424	14
<b>Total Tulkarm</b>				<b>84172</b>	<b>106863</b>	<b>326</b>
Qalqiliya	Falameya	rural	east	502	660	0
	Jayyus	rural	east	2350	3090	15
	Qalqiliya	urban	east	31772	41774	118
	An Nabi Elyas	rural	east	863	1135	0
	'Izbat at Tabib	rural	east	150	197	0
	'Azzun	urban	east	5871	7719	15
	'Arab ar Ramadin al Janubi	rural	west	138	181	15
	'Isla	rural	east	630	828	16
	Wadi ar Rasha	rural	east	76	0	0
	Habla	urban	east	4371	5747	16
	Ras at Tira	rural	west	282	371	15
	Ras 'Atiya	rural	east	1136	1494	0
	Ad Dab'a	rural	west	192	252	0
	Kafr Thulth	rural	east	3101	4077	16
	'Izbat Jal'ud	rural	east	101	133	0
	Al Mudawwar	rural	east	157	206	0
	'Izbat Salman	rural	east	457	601	0
	'Izbat al Ashqar	rural	east	297	391	0
	Beit Amin	rural	east	815	1072	0
	Sanniriya	rural	east	2123	2791	0
	'Azzun 'Atma	rural	west	1187	1561	0
<b>Total Qalqiliya</b>				<b>56571</b>	<b>74281</b>	<b>226</b>
Salfit	Biddya	urban	east	6061	7836	29
	Mas-ha	rural	east	1442	1864	16
<b>Total Safit</b>				<b>7503</b>	<b>9700</b>	<b>45</b>

Governorate/ District	Locality	Locality Type	Location relative to wall	Population, Census 1997	Estimated population, mid-year 2003	Number of households in sample (unweighted)
Jerusalem	Rafat	rural	west	1574	2009	25
	Kafr 'Aqab	rural	west	7715	9848	23
	Al 'Eizariya	urban	east	12893	16458	21
	Abu Dis	urban	east	8975	11456	14
<b>Total Jerusalem</b>				31157	39772	83
Bethlehem	Al Khas	rural	east	253	326	0
	Beit Jala	urban	east	12239	15748	45
	Beit Sahur	urban	east	11285	14521	47
<b>Total Bethlehem</b>				23777	30594	92
<b>Grand Total</b>				224924	288758	890